Incentive-Compatible Critical Values by McCloskey, Adam & Michaillat, Pascal
Incentive-Compatible Critical Values
AdamMcCloskey, Pascal Michaillat
May 2020
Statistical hypothesis tests are a cornerstone of scientic research. The tests are
informative when their size is properly controlled, so the frequency of rejecting true
null hypotheses (type I error) stays below a prespecied nominal level. Publication
bias exaggerates test sizes, however. Since scientists can typically only publish results
that reject the null hypothesis, they have the incentive to continue conducting studies
until attaining rejection. Suchp-hacking takesmany forms: fromcollecting additional
data to examining multiple regression specications, all in the search of statistical
signicance. The process inates test sizes above their nominal levels because the
critical values used to determine rejection assume that test statistics are constructed
from a single study—abstracting from p-hacking. This paper addresses the problem
by constructing critical values that are compatible with scientists’ behavior given
their incentives. We assume that researchers conduct studies until nding a test
statistic that exceeds the critical value, or until the benet from conducting an extra
study falls below the cost. We then solve for the incentive-compatible critical value
(ICCV). When the ICCV is used to determine rejection, readers can be condent that
size is controlled at the desired signicance level, and that the researcher’s response
to the incentives delineated by the critical value is accounted for. Since they allow
researchers to search for signicance among multiple studies, ICCVs are larger than
classical critical values. Yet, for a broad range of researcher behaviors and beliefs,
ICCVs lie in a fairly narrow range.
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1. Introduction
Statistical hypothesis testing is a key tool for scientic investigation and discovery. It is used to
evaluate existing theories andparadigms. In particular it allows for the identication of anomalies:
instances where the theory does not accord well with empirical observations. It is also used to
assess the effectiveness of newmedical treatments, public policies, designs, processes, and other
potential remedies to real-world problems. In that context it allows for the detection of novel
statistically signicant effects.
Scientists conduct many hypothesis tests but they are typically only able to publish those that
reject the null hypothesis under investigation. This preference for “signicant” results is clearly
visible in scientic journals. First identied in psychology journals (Sterling 1959; Bozarth and
Roberts 1972), it has since been observed across the social sciences (Christensen, Freese, and
Miguel 2019, chap. 3), medical sciences (Begg and Berlin 1988; Song et al. 2000; Ioannidis and
Trikalinos 2007; Dwan et al. 2008), biological sciences (Csada, James, and Espie 1996; Jennions
and Moeller 2002), and many other disciplines (Head et al. 2015; Fanelli, Costas, and Ioannidis
2017). This preference may reect the presumption that “signicant” results are more valuable to
scientic progress than “insignicant” results.
Publications, however, are the main output of scientic research, and the main marker
of scientic productivity. A scientist’s publications determine her career path: whether she
will receive tenure, whether she will be promoted further, and at each step what salary she
will command (Gibson, Anderson, and Tressler 2014). Publications also determine a scientist’s
recognition and status in the profession and the resources made available to her such as research
funds, grants and fellowships. Such resources are integral to pursuing new projects and obtaining
additional publications.
Since publishing yields signicant rewards but requires statistically signicant results, scien-
tists are given the incentive to collect and analyze data until they are able to reject the null hy-
pothesis they are investigating (Nosek, Spies, and Motyl 2012). Such behavior is well-documented:
researchers inate reported t -statistics by choosing amongst specications (Brodeur et al. 2016),
they fail to write up experimental results that are not statistically signicant (Franco, Malhotra,
and Simonovits 2014), and they favor reporting statistically signicant outcomes at the expense of
insignicant outcomes (Dwan et al. 2008). And exibility in data collection and analysis affords
researchers many opportunities to obtain statistically signicant results, even when the null
hypothesis is true (Lovell 1983; Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn 2011).
Given this incentive, scientists’ behavior invalidates the assumptions of classical statistics
upon which standard hypothesis testing is based. One key assumption is that scientists report
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whatever they observe froma single data sample that is representative of an underlying population
of interest. Thus, the use of standard critical values (CVs) based upon this assumption to determine
statistical signicance in scientic publications leads to the over-rejection of true null hypotheses.
For instance, when using a standard CV of 1.96 for a two-sided t -test of nominal level 5%, a true
null hypothesis can be rejected much more oen than 5% of the time. This lack of size control is
one of the most troubling consequences of publication bias, “the systematic error induced in a
statistical inference by conditioning on the achievement of publication status” (Begg and Berlin
1988, p. 422).
This consequence of publication bias is problematic because the informativeness of hypothe-
sis tests relies upon properly controlling the size of the test: to limit spurious ndings of statistical
signicance, one must be condent that the frequency of rejecting true null hypotheses does
not exceed a pre-specied nominal level. When using data to test theory, if the size of a test is
too large, too many apparent anomalies will be “discovered” and perfectly sound paradigms may
become disgured or abandoned. In applied science, if the size is too large, ineffective methods,
remedies, or policies will be implemented in the real world, and the problems they were designed
to alleviate may persist or even worsen.
To address the size distortions induced by researchers’ incentives, we construct CVs that are
compatible with these incentives. Our incentive-compatible CVs (ICCVs) therefore bound test
size by the nominal signicance level. To construct ICCVs, we model the strategic behavior of
researchers. Researchers face costs and benets from conducting studies, and these incentives
determine howmany studies researchers conduct.
Imagine for example that a researcher conducts two-sided t -tests at a nominal signicance
level of 5%. The usual CV for such tests based upon the large sample standard normal distribution
of a t -statistic under the null hypothesis is 1.96. Now imagine that the research collects a random
sample of data, performs the test, and fails to reject the null hypothesis because the observed
absolute t -statistic is below 1.96. Given that such a result is unlikely to be published, if the relative
cost is low enough, the researcher may collect another sample of data and analyze it in a further
attempt to reject the null hypothesis. This implies that the CV of 1.96, based upon the large sample
distribution of a t -statistic from a single study in isolation, is generally not incentive-compatible:
it is built upon the assumption that researchers collect one data sample, although it generally
incentivizes them to collect more than one (so long as the benets from publication are large
enough).
Indeed, for a given CV, researchers have the incentive to continue collecting data until either
their test statistic exceeds the CV, or the expected benet from data collection falls below the
collection cost. A CV that is incentive-compatible needs to take this behavior into account to
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bound test size by the nominal signicance level. When the ICCV is used, researchers may still
conduct several studies. Nevertheless, using information about the cost of conducting research,
the rewards to publication, and data-collection process, we can deduce the maximum number
of studies that the researcher has the incentive to conduct at any given CV. From this, we can
compute an upper bound on the distribution of the reported test statistic, and therefore make
sure that the CV achieves the desired signicance level. When using our ICCVs, readers can be
condent that a published rejection of a true null hypothesis occurs no more frequently than the
nominal level of the test.
Because researchers oen conduct more than one study before submitting their results to a
journal, our ICCVs are necessarily larger than standard CVs. In particular, when scientic rewards
are higher or data-collection costs are lower, the ICCVs are larger. Using both theoretical and
numerical results, we obtain ICCVs for a broad range of researcher behavior, research costs,
publication rewards, and researcher prior knowledge; for two-sided tests with 5% nominal
signicance level, we nd ICCVs between 1.96 and 3 instead of the standard 1.96. For elds with
better estimates of the cost and benets of research and of prior knowledge, it is possible to
obtain more precise ICCVs; however, our results indicate that ICCVs are fairly insensitive to these
inputs, yielding convenient rules-of-thumb for practical application.
Other methods to control test size: modeling researcher behavior. The issue of publication bias is
of coursewell-known, and severalmethods have been developed to address various consequences
of it (Christensen, Freese, and Miguel 2019; Wasserstein, Schirm, and Lazar 2019). In this paper
we focus on one important consequence of publication bias: test size distortions. Such distortions
mean that nominal signicance levels (say, 5%) understate the actual probability of rejecting a
true null hypothesis, such that positive results may be due much more to chance—and much less
to the null hypothesis being false—than nominally stated.
To address size distortions, we opt to model researcher behavior and take this behavior into
account to undo the distortions. Our approach is related to other approaches in the literature that
recognize that researcher behavior may invalidate classical assumptions underlying standard
statistical analyses. In particular, Glaeser (2006) assumes that researchers do not report the
result of one study, but the most extreme result from n > 1 studies, and subsequently proposes
corrections to debias estimates arising from researchers’ behavior. Another example is Andrews
and Kasy (2019) who provide a means of adjusting estimates and condence intervals to correct
for the effects of researchers’ behavior in the presence of meta-analyses or replication studies.
However in practice, these techniques are likely to unravel: when corrections based upon assumed
xed behavior are implemented, researchers may then conduct additional studies in search of
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results that overwhelm the initial corrections. Because our method takes researchers’ response
to CVs into account, it is not subject to this limitation and does indeed properly control the size of
the published test results. In this sense, the CVs we propose are incentive compatible.
Other seemingly related methods are lowering the nominal signicance level (Benjamin et al.
2018) or deriving CVs from truncated normal distributions (McCrary, Christensen, and Fanelli
2016). Yet, although these approaches make it harder to reject null hypotheses, they may not
control the size of hypothesis tests because researchers may respond to these new signicance
levels and CVs by conducting even more studies to attain rejection. Finally, although related to
ICCVs, multiple-testing corrections are not useful in our setting because readers cannot observe
the number of studies conducted by the researcher. Multiple-testing corrections can only be used
when the number of studies is xed and known. Similarly, “always-valid” sequential condence
intervals orp-values could be applied in principle to control size in some contexts that we consider,
namely “pooling” data; but these techniques also require that the number of studies conducted
by the researcher is known (see Johari, Pekelis, and Walsh 2019; Howard et al. 2019).
Other methods to control test size: constraining researcher behavior. A different approach to
controlling test size consists of constraining researchers’ behavior through a pre-analysis plan
(PAP), so they indeed only conduct one study and report the results from that study (Miguel
et al. 2014; Olken 2015; Coffman and Niederle 2015). With such constraints, researchers’ behavior
conforms to the assumptions fromclassical statistics and publication bias disappears. In exchange
for abiding by a PAP, journals could promise to publish results irrespective of signicance as long
as the research design is of sufcient quality (Christensen, Freese, and Miguel 2019, pp. 110–112).
Results-blind review would eliminate journals’ current preference for signicance and thus
researchers’ incentive to work within the boundaries of the PAP to obtain signicance.
Christensen, Freese, and Miguel (2019, pp. 107–117) discuss the strengths and limitations
of PAPs. An important limitation is that PAPs prevent scientists from engaging in exploratory
analysis, although it is oen a source of new ideas and scientic discoveries. With observational
data, an additional problem is that it would difcult to ensure that the PAP is written before the
data are observed.1
1Gelman and Loken (2014, p. 464) concur: “Formost of our own research projects [a PAP] hardly seems possible: In
our many applied research projects, we have learned so much by looking at the data. Our most important hypotheses
could never have been formulated ahead of time. . . . In any case, as applied social science researchers we are oen
analyzing public data on education trends, elections, the economy, and public opinion that have already been studied
by others many times before, and it would be close to meaningless to consider preregistration for data with which we
are already so familiar. . . . The most valuable statistical analyses oen arise only aer an iterative process involving
the data. Preregistration may be practical in some elds and for some types of problems, but it cannot realistically
be a general solution.”
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The ICCV and PAP approaches therefore appear complementary. Relying on ICCVs could be
particularly helpful in two settings. First, because the ICCV approach is much more exible than
the PAP approach, it could be useful for more innovative, less explored research questions, for
which it is surely fruitful to let researchers explore the data without any constraints. Second,
because the ICCV approach does not require one to have never seen the data, it could be useful
with observational data, which are oen familiar to researchers (for instance, the time series of
unemployment and nominal interest rates in macroeconomics). Finally, PAPs are not entirely
enforceable and still allow researchers some latitude to deviate from a strict plan of execution.
ICCVs based upon limited forms of p-hacking could be used in conjunction with PAPs to further
ensure correct size.
Methods to correct other facets of publication bias. The focus of this paper is on controlling the
size of hypothesis tests, which is inated by publication bias. Publication bias also takes other
forms, which our methodology cannot address, and which require additional corrections. For
example, our methodology does not address the fact that only signicant results are published,
and almost all non-signicant results remain unpublished, or even unwritten. Such selectivity is
a problem for meta-analyses of literatures: a large subset of all studies may never appear in print,
biasing the evidence included in meta-analyses (Rosenthal 1979). This bias is different from ours;
it would occur even if scientists were not strategic and did not respond to incentives: even then
the sample of published studies would be truncated at the signicance level. Numerous methods
have been developed to address this bias, and they would continue to be useful in meta-analyses
even if ICCVs replaced standard CVs.2
2. Research and publication process
We start by modeling the process of research and publication. We assume that researchers in a
scientic community are interested in inferring the true value of a parameter β ∈ R. In particular,
we focus on problems for which scientists wish to test a particular null hypothesis for the value
that β takes. In economics, the parameter β is oen a causal or treatment effect, a regression
coefcient, or a parameter in a structural model.
For concreteness, we focus on the most common hypotheses used in economics: two-sided
2See Begg and Berlin (1988, sec. 5.3), Lau, Ioannidis, and Schmid (1998), and Stanley (2005) for surveys of publica-
tions bias in meta-analysis and solutions to debias the meta-estimates. See Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons (2014)
and Andrews and Kasy (2019) for recent procedures to tackle publication bias in meta-analysis.
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hypotheses of the form
(1) H0 : β = β0 versus H1 : β , β0,
where H0 and H1 constitute the null and alternative hypotheses of interest. In the common
application of statistical signicance testing, β0 takes the value of zero. The analysis here extends
straightforwardly to one-sided hypotheses (appendix B).
Aer performing statistical tests of (1), researchers communicate their ndings in journals.
We assume that journal editors only wish to publish papers that reject the prevailing null hypothe-
sis characterized byH0. We characterize journals as wishing to publish “signicant” or “non-null”
results, as is common practice in economics and many other disciplines. Researchers gather data
to form a t -statistic for testing (1) and report the value of this statistic to a journal. Common prac-
tice in empirical work is to then deemH0 as rejected or the result of the research as “statistically
signicant” if the absolute value of the statistic exceeds an appropriate CV. Researchers receive
an expected payoffv > 0 for producing a study that rejectsH0. The value that expected payoff
v takes depends upon the set of journals the researcher intends to submit to and the research
question itself. For example, a researcher receives a higher expected payoff for submitting their
work to a more prestigious set of journals but a lower expected payoff if those journals do not
nd the research question interesting.
It is commonpractice to derive theCV that determines rejection ofH0 from theupper quantiles
of a standard normal distribution as this is the approximate large-sample distribution of a t -
statistic under standard assumptions whenH0 holds. One of these standard assumptions is that
only a singlemodel and dataset is used to form the t -statistic. However, this assumption is violated
in most applied research. Typically, a researcher looks through multiple model specications or
sets of data to form statistics. Given a researcher’s positive payoff from publishing their work, we
work under the assumption that the researcher actually reports the maximum absolute value
of a set of latent t -statistics, generated across different sets of data or model specications, to
maximize his chances of rejecting H0. Formally, we model the researcher as constructing a
sequence ofn t -statisticsX ∗1 , . . . ,X
∗
n fromn “studies” that are unobservable to the editor. As usual,
we assume the latent t -statistics take the form
(2) X ∗i =
βˆi − β0
se(βˆi)
,
where βˆi denotes the estimator of β in study i and se(βˆi) denotes a consistent standard error
estimator for βˆi . Aer conducting n studies, the researcher reportsXn = max
{ |X ∗1 |, . . . , |X ∗n |}
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to the journal upon submission of his research article. By standard central limit theorem and
standard error consistency arguments, each of the latent t -statisticsX ∗i is approximately normally
distributed with unit variance whenH0 holds. In particular underH0,X ∗i ∼ N(0, 1). Unless n = 1,
the use of a standard CV equal to the 1 − α/2 quantile of a standard normal distribution results in
over-rejection of a true null hypothesis as the reported statistic is distributed as the maximum
absolute value of a sequence of normal random variables. That is, the probability of rejectingH0
when it is true is greater than the nominal level α . This over-rejection is the type of publication
bias we aim to correct.
The researcher determines when to stop conducting additional studies based upon amarginal
cost-benet analysis. Aer conducting n − 1 studies, the researcher receives the expected pay-
off of v > 0 if and only if Xn exceeds the CV z used by the editor to determine a statistically
signicant rejection of H0. If Xn−1 < z, the researcher chooses to conduct the nth study if the
expected marginal payoff of conducting this additional study exceeds the expected cost of doing
so. Formally, we model the expected benet of conducting the nth study as
v P
(
Xn > z
 X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z),
where P is the researcher’s subjective probability measure that incorporates his beliefs on the
true value of β and X ∗n = (X ∗1 , . . . ,X ∗n ).3 We may wish to allow the expected cost of a study to
depend upon the specic nature of that study. The costs of studies can vary due factors such
as different costs of acquiring data or running experiments or differences in the opportunity
costs of different studies. In the most general version of our model, we assume the researcher
incurs an expected marginal cost of c(n) ≥ 0 for conducting the nth study. Aer n − 1 studies, the
researcher’s expected marginal prot from conducting the nth study is thus
E
(
pi (Xn,Xn−1; z,v, c)
 X ∗n−1) = v P(Xn > z  X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(n)
= v P
(
max
{ |X ∗n |,Xn−1} > z  X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(n)
= v P
(|X ∗n | > z  X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(n).(3)
However, the researcher has the option to conduct further studies aer the nth study if and
only if he chooses to conduct the nth study. Thus, conducting the nth study not only yields the
direct payoff in (3) but also the indirect payoff of the option value to conduct further studies,
leading to a dynamic decision problem. Nevertheless, in the following proposition we show that
if the researcher pursues studies in the order of their direct expected protability, pursuing
3Conditioning onX ∗n−1 does not make sense when n = 1. As a notational convention, we setX
∗
0 = X
∗
0 = 0.
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more protable studies before less protable ones, the decision problem is static, involving only
whether the marginal prot in (3) is positive.
Proposition 1. Supposev P(|X ∗n | > z |X∗n−1)−c(n) ≥ v P(|X ∗n+j | > z |X∗n−1)−c(n+ j) for all j > 0.
Then the researcher chooses to conduct the next study if and only if Xn−1 < z and
v P(|X ∗n | > z |X∗n−1) − c(n) ≥ 0.
Since it is reasonable to believe that researchers pursue studies in order of their protability,
we model the researcher as conducting the nth study according to whether (3) is positive or
negative. Taking the reader or editor’s perspective, for a given CV z, we seek to characterize the
maximum number of studies that are protable for the researcher to pursue. That is we seek
to characterize the maximum n = N (z) for which E(pi (Xn−1,Xn; z,v, c)  X ∗n−1) > 0 because
according to his incentives, the researcher reportsXN (z) when faced with the CV z. If the editor
chooses the CV threshold by looking at the upper α -quantile ofXN (z) underH0, she can therefore
be condent that when H0 holds she will receive a submission with probability α . Since N (z)
endogenously depends upon z, the editor should then wish to nd the value of z at which the
probability that XN (z) exceeds z is no larger than α when H0 is true. This guarantees that over
repeated submissions of results in favor ofH1, less than 100 · α% of these results are false when
H0 is the truth.
Our goal is to characterize the value of the CV z = z∗ that, based upon the researcher’s
incentives, does not lead to over-rejection of a trueH0. That is, we seek to nd the smallest value
z∗ such that
(4) PH0(XN (z∗) ≥ z∗) ≤ α ,
where PH0 denotes the objective probability measure given that the null hypothesis holds.
4 We
dene this z∗ as the incentive-compatible critical value since the researcher has no incentive to
conduct additional studies that would result in rejecting a trueH0 with probability larger than the
nominal level of α . From the point of view of the editor, the maximum N (z) is a random variable
since it depends upon the latent t -statisticsX ∗i ’s. Nevertheless, if we know the joint distribution
of the sequence of latent t -statisticsX ∗i ’s, we may obtain the distribution of N (z). We now state
a general result ensuring that the ICCV z∗ is well-dened and providing a sufcient condition
under which it yields tests with non-trivial power.
4We seek to nd the smallest z∗ satisfying (4) in order to maximize power subject to controlling size.
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Table 1. Parameter values in simulations
Description Source
1.99 Mean of t -statistic prior Roth and Murnighan (1978); Murnighan and Roth (1983)
0.40 Standard deviation of t -statistic prior Roth and Murnighan (1978); Murnighan and Roth (1983)
v = 5000 Expected value of a publication Gibson, Anderson, and Tressler (2014)
c = 933 Cost of a study Dal Bo (2005)
ϵ = 1 Cost elasticity –
Proposition 2. Supposev P(|X ∗n | > z |X∗n−1)−c(n) ≥ v P(|X ∗n+j | > z |X∗n−1)−c(n+ j) for all j > 0
and c(1) > 0. The ICCV z∗ dened in (4), (i) exists and (ii) yields a test with non-zero power if and
only if P(|X ∗1 | > z∗) ≥ c(1)/v .
We now study different settings that yield different cost functions, subjective probability
measures and joint distributions of latent studies, leading us to different conclusions on how z∗
ought to be chosen by the journal editor so (4) holds.
3. Illustrative calibration
In the next sections we construct ICCVs under different assumptions about researchers and the
research process. In these different cases we derive theoretical results and compute the ICCVs in
Monte Carlo simulations. Here, as a preamble, we calibrate the parameters of our model (table 1).
We use these calibrated values in the subsequent simulations. The calibration also illustrates how
the model can be mapped to the actual research process.
This illustrative calibration is based on Dal Bo (2005). There are several advantages to using
this paper for calibration. First, it is based on independent and (nearly) identically distributed
laboratory experiments, making it straightforward to model the joint distribution of X∗n. Sec-
ond, everything in the paper is well documented, making calibration of most model parameters
straightforward. Third, the paper is based on a specic question, within a well delineated litera-
ture, making the calibration of reasonable subjective beliefs of the researcher straightforward.
Conceptually, the null hypothesis explored by Dal Bo is H0: people do not account for the
future in strategic decisions; the alternative hypothesis isH1: people do account for the future in
strategic decisions. The hypothesis is explored in eight experiments. Dal Bo compares the level
of cooperation in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games that have different probabilities of continu-
ation. In some treatments, the prisoner’s dilemma games are one-shot. The only equilibrium is
no cooperation, so players are not expected to cooperate. In other treatments, the probability
of continuation—which governs the probability of future interaction between players—is 1/2 or
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3/4. In these treatments, while no cooperation remains an equilibrium outcome, cooperation
equilibria also appear. Then, the likelihood of cooperation between players is expected to increase.
Formally, the statistical parameter of interest β is the difference in the cooperation probability
between games in which theory predicts no cooperation and games in which theory predicts
possible cooperation. The null and alternative hypotheses become
H0 : β = 0 versus H1 : β , 0.
Here, we model the alternative hypothesis as two-sided, in agreement with convention for empir-
ical work in economics. To test the alternative that the possibility of future interaction increases
cooperation, it might be more appropriate to use the upper one-sided alternativeH1 : β > 0—a
test covered in appendix B.
The rst parameter to calibrate is Dal Bo’s subjective prior belief about the mean of the
t -statistic, which is equal to β/sd(βˆ). Here, we take an empirical Bayes approach, eliciting Dal
Bo’s prior from previous estimates. Before Dal Bo’s article, there were two articles on the same
topic: Roth and Murnighan (1978) and Murnighan and Roth (1983). Dal Bo presumably used these
two precursors to form his prior beliefs about the true value of β . In fact, Dal Bo (2005, table 1)
reports the results from these studies. Although these studies report estimates of β , they do not
report the associated t -statistics or standard errors se(βˆ), which are estimates of sd(βˆ). However,
the matched pairs design of the experiments in these studies, allows us to bound se(βˆ) from
above and below in each study. We then simply take the midpoint of these bounds to equal the
estimate of sd(βˆ) used to calibrate the researcher’s prior for β/sd(βˆ). The details are provided in
appendix C.
We obtained four previous values of t -statistics for testingH0, β/sd(βˆ), from the four treat-
ments in the two articles. Taking the sample size-weighted average of these values, we obtain the
mean of the prior belief on the mean of the t -statistic: E(β/sd(βˆ)) = 1.99.5 Taking the (sample
size-weighted) sample variance of these values, we obtain the variance of the prior belief on the
mean of the t -statistic: var(β/sd(βˆ)) = 0.42. Finally, we assume that Dal Bo’s subjective prior
follows a normal distribution.6
The laboratory where the experiments were conducted was available at no cost, so the
marginal cost of an experiment is the cost to pay the participants and the research assistant
monitoring them. On average, there are 48.75 subjects in each experiment, and each subject earns
$18.94, so paying the participants costs 48.75× $18.94 = $923.3. In addition each experiment lasts
5The weights account for the fact that one study has 121 subjects while the other has 252 subjects.
6From an empirical Bayes perspective, a normal prior can be justied when averaging results of previous studies
via a central limit theorem.
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one hour, so the research assistant must be paid for that time, which we assume costs $10. The
average cost of an experiment therefore is c = $923.30 + $10 = $933.30.
Dal Bo’s objective is to reject the null hypothesis that people are not forward-looking. Such
result opens the door to a publication in a top economics journal—and indeed Dal Bo’s work was
published in the American Economic Review (AER). What is the value of such publication? Using
data from the University of California system, Gibson, Anderson, and Tressler (2014) nd that the
publication of 10 AER-quality pages increases academic earnings by 1.3%, which translates to a
net present value over an entire career of about $28,466. Since the length of Dal Bo’s article is
14 pages, its value is $28, 466 × 1.4 = $39, 853. The same would be true of articles published in
the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Econometrica, and Journal of Political Economy. The value
of publishing in other journals can be inferred from their relative ranking compared to these top
journals (see Gibson, Anderson, and Tressler 2017, table A1). Of course obtaining a signicant
result is not sufcient to publish in the top journals: each of them publishes less than 5% of
the articles they receive (Card and DellaVigna 2013; Zheng and Kaiser 2016). Depending on the
correlation structure between the decisions of these top journals, as well as the correlations
with decisions of lower-ranked journals, we could compute the expected net present value of
submitting a signicant result. We approximate this value asv = $5, 000. We will see that the
cost-benet ratio, c/v, actually determines the ICCV.
In appendix D, we provide an alternative indirect method for eliciting the implied value of
this ratio from the number of studies a researcher would typically conduct without rejectingH0
before moving on to a different research question. Again using data from Dal Bo (2005), we nd a
range of implied values consistent with the calibrated value of c/v = 933/5, 000 ≈ 0.19.
4. Baseline: an impossibility result
To build intuition, we begin with the simplest version of our model of research and publication.
Consider a researcher who may conduct a sequence of independent studies to determine the
value of β , where the estimator of β in study i, βˆi , is constructed from the data gathered in
study i only. These estimators are statistically identical and, appealing to a standard central limit
theorem, approximately distributed asN(β , var(βˆ)) in large samples. This case would arise for
example when the studies are experiments, the sample size in each experiment is the same and
the observations in each experiment are drawn from the same underlying population. Since the
researcher does not know the true value β , we treat it as a random variable from his point of
view and write βˆi |β iid∼ N(β, var(βˆ)). In this setting, the latent t -statistics are independent and
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identically distributed approximately following a normal distribution:
X ∗i |θ iid∼ N(θ , 1), where θ =
β − β0
sd(βˆ)
is a scaled version of the difference between the true value β and its null version hypothesized β0
with sd(βˆ) being the true population standard deviation of βˆ . Note that in this setting, the null
and alternative hypotheses (1) are equivalent to
(5) H0 : θ = 0 versus H1 : θ , 0.
Suppose the researcher incurs a constant cost of c(n + 1) = c ≥ 0 for conducting each
additional study. The researcher has a prior distribution on θ of F (θ ).7 This prior distribution
may arise, for example, as the result of previous studies conducted by other researchers or as
the biases of the researcher. For now we assume that the researcher does not learn about θ in
the process of conducting his studies so his subjective distribution on θ does not change as he
conducts more studies. Specializing (3) to the current context, the expected marginal prot from
conducting an additional study aer conducting n − 1 studies already is equal to
E
(
pi (Xn,Xn−1; z,v, c)
 X ∗n−1) = v ∫ P(|Xn |∗ > z  X ∗n−1,θ )dF (θ ) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c
= v
∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ ) +Φ(−z − θ )]dF (θ ) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c .(6)
At stagen−1, the researcher engages in another study if andonly if E(pi (Xn,Xn−1; z,v, c) | X ∗n−1) >
0. That is, he will conduct another study if and only ifXn−1 < z and
(7)
∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ ) +Φ(−z − θ )]dF (θ ) ≥ c
v
.
Now we can make two observations:
Remark 1. Depending upon the values c,v, z and θ , either the researcher conducts zero studies or
continues to conduct studies indenitely until X ∗n > z.
Remark 2. A low marginal cost c , high payo v , low CV z or a prior distribution placing large
weight on large values of θ lead to engagement in studies indenitely searching for signicance.
Given remark 1, it is actually impossible for the journal editor to set the CV z to a value so
the probability that the observedXn exceeds z is between zero and one underH0. If z is set low
7Since θ = β−β0
sd(βˆ ) , this prior can be elicited directly from a prior on the original parameter of interest β .
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enough for (7) to hold, the researcher continues to conduct studies until he rejectsH0. Conversely,
if the editor sets z high enough so (7) is violated, the researcher never conducts a single study.
In other words, depending upon the editor’s choice of z, the resulting size of the test is either
zero (and so is the power) or one. In both cases, the test becomes uninformative. Therefore, it is
impossible to nd an ICCV in this setting that yields an informative test. The threshold choice of
CV z that dictates which of these two cases pertains is equal to about 3 for the calibrated model
inputs from the previous section.
In the next three sections, we show that this impossibility result is a special case that relies
on (i) a constant marginal cost, (ii) a researcher that does not learn and (iii) studies that are
independent of each other.
5. Sampling increasingly costly data
We now modify the analysis of section 4 by assuming that the expected cost of conducting
an additional study is increasing in the number of studies already run. This modication can
incorporate situations in which it becomes increasingly costly to collect new data or run new
experiments or could simply capture increasing marginal opportunity costs on the part of the
researcher. In terms of the marginal cost function introduced in section 2, we assume that c :
R+ → R+ is continuous, strictly increasing, c(0) = 0 and limn→∞ c(n) = ∞. These assumptions
ensure that new studies eventually become overwhelmingly costly so a researcher eventually
stops conducting new studies pertaining to (1) and that it is costless not to conduct a study. The
continuity assumption is without loss of generality since c will only be evaluated at integer values.
We maintain all of the other assumptions of section 4 so an analogous analysis leads us to the
conclusion that at stage n − 1, the researcher engages in the nth study if and only ifXn−1 < z and
(8)
∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ ) +Φ(−z − θ )]dF (θ ) ≥ c(n)
v
.
For this problem, N (z) is thus equal to the maximum positive integer n for whichXn−1 < z and
the above condition holds underH0. If
(9)
∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ ) +Φ(−z − θ )]dF (θ ) < c(1)
v
,
N (z) = 0 since it is not protable to engage in any studies of (1). This occurs when the expected
returns to examining the research question are too low because, given the researcher’s beliefs
characterizedby F (θ ), the signicance thresholdz is too large relative toc(1)/v. Since themarginal
cost function is strictly increasing in this setting, we obtain the following result that breaks the
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impossibility result of the previous section.
Proposition 3. For any CV z, the researcher eventually stops conducting studies even if he never
attains rejection.
SinceXn is the maximum of the absolute value of nmean-zero iid normal variables underH0,
PH0(Xn < z) = [Φ(z) −Φ(−z)]n for z ≥ 0 so we can rewrite the (implicit) denition of the ICCV in
this context as the smallest value z∗ such that
1 − [Φ(z∗) −Φ(−z∗)]N (z∗) ≤ α .
If the researcher’s prior distribution F (θ ) is conjugate with the normal distribution, the computa-
tion of N (z) simplies because the integral in the continuation condition (8) can be expressed in
closed form. The proposition belowprovides three examples of such computational simplication:
a mass point prior, a uniform prior, and a normal prior.
Proposition 4. In the increasing cost setting of this section, N (z) is equal to the maximum
positive integer n for which Xn−1 < z and
1. if dF (θ ) = δ (θ˜ )dθ for some θ˜ ∈ R, where δ denotes the Dirac delta function,
n ≤ c−1
(
v[1 −Φ(z − θ˜ ) +Φ(−z − θ˜ )]
)
;
2. if dF (θ ) = (b − a)−1 1(a ≤ θ ≤ b)dθ for some a < b,
n ≤ c−1(v[1 − (b − a)−1{ϕ(z − b) − ϕ(z − a) + (b − z)Φ(z − b) + (z − a)Φ(z − a)
− ϕ(−z − b) + ϕ(−z − a) − (b + z)Φ(−z − b) + (a + z)Φ(−z − a)}]);
3. if dF (θ ) = σ−1ϕ((θ − µ)/σ )dθ for some µ ∈ R and σ > 0,
n ≤ c−1(v[1 −Φ((z − µ)/
√
1 + σ 2) +Φ((−z − µ)/
√
1 + σ 2)]).
For each of these special cases, it would be reasonable for the editor to take an empirical
Bayes approach and estimate the parameters entering the prior distributions using data from
previous studies.
The analysis yields the following remarks:
Remark 3. If the expected payo from rejectingH0,v , is larger, the ICCV z∗ is larger. This means
that editors evaluating research about “important” questions should impose higher CVs. All else
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xed, researchers have more incentive to search across many studies when the publication payo
is higher. A larger CV can be used by the editor to counteract the higher rate of false rejections
induced by these high payos by reducing the incentive to conduct many studies.
Remark 4. If the cost of running experiments, c(n), is larger, the ICCV z∗ is smaller. This means
that editors evaluating research with high costs should impose smaller CVs (and vice versa). All
else xed, researchers have less incentive to conduct studies when they are costly. A smaller CV
can be used by the editor to account for high research costs by increasing the incentive to conduct
studies.
Remark 5. The more probability mass a researcher’s prior places on large values of θ , the larger
the ICCV z∗ is. This means that editors evaluating studies for which researchers are more condent
that H0 is violated should impose a larger CVs. When they are more condent that H0 is false,
researchers expect larger payos from continuing to conduct studies. All else equal, this gives
researchers more incentive to continue conducting studies on (1). Hence, a larger CV can be used
by the editor to counteract the corresponding higher rate of false rejections.
Remark 6. In practice, the journal editor may not know the prior of the researcher. However, it
is reasonable to estimate this prior from the outcomes of past studies, either parametrically or
nonparametrically. If there are no past studies to gather data from, it is reasonable to simply use
a diuse prior.
The ICCVs with increasingly costly studies, obtained by Monte-Carlo simulations, are il-
lustrated in gure 1. A rst insight from the gure is that the publication bias that we aim to
correct—the size distortion of hypothesis tests—may be fairly large. The gure displays the size
of a two-sided hypothesis test at the standard 5% CV of 1.96, for various priors (panel A), various
cost-benet ratios (panel C), and various cost elasticities (panel E). If researchers conducted only
one study and performed the hypothesis test on it, as is assumed in classical statistics, the size
would be 5%. But when researchers sample datasets, the size is much higher than 5%: as high as
24% in panel A, 23% in panel C, and 30% in panel E. So a signicant result is much more likely to
be due to luck than advertised by the nominal signicance level of 5%.
A second insight from the gure is that the ICCVs required to bring back the actual test size
to 5% are above the standard value of 1.96 but not by a tremendous amount. The gure displays
the ICCV that delivers a size of 5% for two-sided tests, for various priors (panel B), various cost-
benet ratios (panel D), and various cost elasticities (panel F). Across parameterizations, the ICCV
is above 1.96 but never above 2.5. Moreover, prior beliefs about the estimated parameter and
incentives faced by researchers do not have a strong impact on the ICCV. Across a broad range of
priors and cost-benet ratios from publication, the ICCV lies between 1.96 and 2.5.
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Figure 1. ICCVs at 5% signicance level when researchers sample increasingly costly data
This gure considers researchers who attempt to obtain signicance in two-sided hypothesis tests by sampling iid
datasets that are increasingly costly to collect: collecting the nth dataset costs c(n) = c0 × nϵ , where ϵ is the cost
elasticity. All results are obtained from Monte-Carlo simulations with the parameter values in table 1, except for
those parameter values specied on the axes. Panels A, C, and E display the size of the hypothesis test at the standard
CV of 1.96, for various priors (panel A), various cost-benet ratios (panel C), and various cost elasticities (panel E).
If researchers collected only one dataset and conducted the test on it, as is assumed in classical statistics, the size
would be 5%. But when researchers sample datasets, the size is much higher than 5%, sometimes as high as 25%.
Panels B, D, and F display the ICCV that delivers a size of 5%, for various priors (panel B), various cost-benet ratios
(panel D), and various cost elasticities (panel F). Across parameterizations, the ICCV falls between 1.96 and 2.6.
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6. Learning while sampling data
We now depart from section 4 by allowing the researcher to learn about the true value of θ .
To keep the analysis straightforward we assume that as he conducts successive studies, the
researcher updates his prior distribution F (θ ) according to Bayes’ rule but maintain all of the
other assumptions of section 4. Learning about the true value of θ can induce the researcher to
stop conducting additional studies, breaking the negative result of section 4.
Aer n − 1 studies, instead of using his prior distribution F (θ ) to compute the expected
marginal prot from conducting an additional study according to (6), the researcher incorporates
all of the information contained in the n − 1 studies by using the posterior distribution F (θ |X ∗n−1).
Assuming that the researcher’s prior distribution F (θ ) admits a pdf f (θ ), for n ≥ 1, the posterior
pdf for θ takes the form
(10) f (θ |X ∗n ) =
f (X ∗n |θ )f (θ )∫
f (X ∗n |θ )f (θ )dθ
,
where the likelihood f (X ∗n |θ ) is the pdf of aN(θιn, In)distribution evaluated atX ∗n with ιn denoting
an n-vector of one’s. This is the joint pdf corresponding to the random vectorX ∗n when the value
of θ is known. As a notational convention, for n = 0, F (θ |X ∗n ) is equal to F (θ ). Maintaining all of
the other assumptions in section 4, we arrive at the conclusion that at stage n − 1, the researcher
engages in the nth study if and only ifXn−1 < z and
(11)
∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ ) +Φ(−z − θ )]dF (θ |X ∗n−1) ≥
c
v
.
In contrast to the previous section, even if we know Xn−1 < z, whether or not the researcher
chooses to engage in another study depends upon the realization of the random vectorX ∗n−1. For
example, if the researcher obtains a large draw for |X ∗n−1 | that is not quite large enough to cross
the threshold z, his posterior for θ will be updated to shi probability mass toward larger values
and (11) can hold. On the other hand, a very small draw for |X ∗n−1 | can induce his posterior to
shi probability mass toward very small values so (11) can be violated. These facts break the
impossibility result of section 4 so we can dene N (z) to be the largest n for which Xn−1 < z
and (11) holds when the data are generated underH0. As in proposition 5, we obtain a result that
breaks the impossibility result of section 4.
Proposition 5. Let θ ∗ denote the true value of θ . For any CV z large enough such that 1−Φ(z −
θ ∗) +Φ(z − θ ∗) < c/v , the researcher eventually stops conducting studies even if he never attains
rejection.
17
The computation of z∗ in this context is complicated by the fact that F (θ |X ∗n−1) depends upon
the realizations of prior studies, which are not observed by the journal editor. Nevertheless, since
we know the distribution ofX ∗n−1 underH0, namelyN(0, In−1), z∗ remains feasible to compute in
the presence of learning by the researcher. In the following proposition, we examine the special
case for which the researcher’s prior on θ follows aN(µ,σ 2) distribution since this distribution
results naturally from an empirical Bayes approach to prior construction (via a central limit
theorem approximation) and because it provides analytically tractable results that are useful for
conveying intuition.
Proposition 6. In the learning while sampling setting of this section, if dF (θ ) = σ−1ϕ((θ −
µ)/σ )dθ for some µ ∈ R and σ > 0, then N (z) is the largest positive integer n for which Xn−1 < z
and
1 −Φ ©­­«
z − µn |n−1√
1 + σ 2
n |n−1
ª®®¬ +Φ
©­­«
−z − µn |n−1√
1 + σ 2
n |n−1
ª®®¬ ≥ c/v,
where
µn |n−1 =
σ 2
∑n−1
i=1 X
∗
i + µ
(n − 1)σ 2 + 1 and σ
2
n |n−1 =
σ 2
(n − 1)σ 2 + 1 .
This proposition allows us to make a few observations:
Remark 7. The mean of the posterior distribution µn |n−1 = (n−1)σ
2
(n−1)σ 2+1X¯
∗
n−1+
1
(n−1)σ 2+1µ is a weighted
average of the sample mean of previous latent studies X¯ ∗n−1 ≡ (n − 1)−1
∑n−1
i=1 X
∗
i and the prior
mean µ, where the former receives relatively more weight as the number of previous studies n − 1
increases. For example, in the simplest case of only one previous study and a prior variance equal
to the variance of that previous study (σ 2 = 1), the posterior mean is equal to the arithmetic
average of the realization of the previous study and the prior mean.
Remark 8. As the number of previous studies n grows large, the posterior mean µn+1|n converges
to the sample mean of the previous studies.
Remark 9. As the number of previous studies n grows large, the posterior variance σ 2
n+1|n =
σ 2/(nσ 2 + 1) shrinks toward zero. In conjunction with remark 8, this implies that for very large
n the posterior distribution concentrates heavily around the sample mean of the previous studies,
which by the law of large numbers converges to the true value θ . This is simply a consequence of a
more general Bernstein-von Mises theorem or standard posterior contraction result from Bayesian
statistics. Letting the true value of θ be denoted by θ ∗ this implies that the researcher must even-
tually stop conducting studies if 1 −Φ(z − θ ∗) +Φ(−z − θ ∗) < c/v . SinceΦ is strictly increasing
and limx→∞Φ(x) = 1 and c/v > 0, this implies that for any θ ∗, there is a z large enough that
induces the researcher to eventually stop conducting studies.
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Figure 2. ICCVs at 5% signicance level when researchers learn while sampling data
The gure considers researchers who attempt to obtain signicance in two-sided hypothesis tests by sampling
iid datasets, and who update their beliefs about the distribution of the t -statistic aer observing the value of the
t -statistic in each new dataset. All results are obtained fromMonte-Carlo simulations with the parameter values in
table 1, except for those parameter values specied on the axes. Panels A and C display the size of the hypothesis
test at the standard CV of 1.96, for various priors (panel A) and various cost-benet ratios (panel C). If researchers
collected only one dataset and conducted the test on it, as is assumed in classical statistics, the size would be 5%.
But when researchers sample datasets, the size is much higher than 5%, sometimes as high as 100%. Panels B and
D display the ICCV that delivers a size of 5%, for various priors (panel B) and various cost-benet ratios (panel D).
Across parameterizations, the ICCV falls between 1.96 and 3.4.
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The ICCVs when researchers learn while sampling data, obtained by Monte Carlo simulations,
are illustrated in gure 2. As in gure 1, the publication bias that we aim to correct—the size
distortion of hypothesis tests—may be fairly large. The gure displays the size of a two-sided
hypothesis test at the standard CV of 1.96, for various priors (panel A) and various cost-benet
ratios (panel C).When researchers learnwhile sampling datasets, the size ismuch higher than 5%:
as high as 100% in panel A and 53% in panel C. So in this context, for a broad range of parameter
values, a null hypothesis is more likely to be rejected than not even when it is true (as size is above
50% for a broad range of parameter values).
As in gure 1, the ICCVs required to bring back the actual test size to 5% are above 1.96 but not
by a tremendous amount. The gure displays the ICCV that delivers a size of 5% for two-sided tests,
for various priors (panel B) and various cost-benet ratios (panel D). Across parameterizations
the ICCV is above 1.96 but never above 3.4—and typically well below 3.
Finally, the incentives faced by researchers do not have a strong impact on the ICCV. Across a
broad range of cost-benet ratios from publication, the ICCV remains between 2.2 and 2.6. On the
other hand, prior beliefs about the estimate (especially the prior mean) have a stronger impact
on the ICCV than in gure 1.
7. Pooling data
Instead of allowing the researcher to learn about the true value of θ , we take a different departure
from section 4 here and have the researcher accumulate data as he moves from one study to the
next. To keep the analysis simple, suppose that the ith study involves collecting an additional
T random variables with associated constant cost c(i) = c and the researcher’s estimate of β in
the ith study is equal to the sample mean of the n ×T independent and identically distributed
random variables collected thus far. That is,
βˆi =
1
iT
iT∑
j=1
Yj
for some sequence of independent and identically distributed random variablesY1, . . . ,YiT . In
this setting, a standard large sample approximation yields βˆi |β ∼ N(β, var(Yj)/(iT )). However,
since they use some of the same underlying random variables in their construction, the different
βˆi ’s are no longer independent of one another. Instead, they are jointly normally distributed with
cov(βˆi , βˆk) = 1
kT
var(Yj)
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for i ≤ k. In turn, the latent t -statistics are jointly normally distributed according to
X ∗i |θ ∼ N(
√
iθ , 1), where θ =
√
T (β − β0)
sd(Yj)
and cov(X ∗i ,X ∗k ) =
√
i/k for i ≤ k.
Due to the correlation between the latent t -statistics as well as their differing means, special-
izing (3) to the current context changes the expression for the expected marginal prot from
conducting an additional study from (6). In this setting,
X ∗n |X ∗n−1 = x∗n−1,θ ∼ N
(
√
nθ +
√
n − 1
n
(x∗n−1 −
√
n − 1θ ), 1
n
)
,
so that
E
(
pi (Xn,Xn−1; z,v, c)
 X ∗n−1) = v ∫ P(|X ∗n | > z  X ∗n−1,θ )dF (θ ) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(12)
= v
∫ [
1 −Φ
(√
nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)
+Φ
(
−√nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)]
dF (θ ) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c .
Hence, the researcher engages in the additional study if and only ifXn−1 < z and
(13)
∫ [
1 −Φ
(√
nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)
+Φ
(
−√nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)]
dF (θ ) ≥ c
v
.
Similarly to the case with learning, even if we knowXn−1 < z, the researcher’s choice to engage
in another study depends upon the realization of the previous latent t -statisticX ∗n−1. Though the
mechanism through which the previous latent t -statistic determines the researcher’s choice here
is different from the case with learning, the qualitative effect is similar: large enough draws of
X ∗n−1 cause (13) to hold while small enough draws can cause it to be violated. This effect arises
because the researcher is accumulating data, rather than updating his prior, so the previous latent
t -statistic contains a lot of information about the subsequent t -statistics. As in propositions 3 and
5, we obtain a result that breaks the impossibility result of section 4, this time in the context of
pooling data.
Proposition 7. Under H0, for any CV z > 0, the researcher will eventually stop conducting
studies even if he never attains rejection.
Since the impossibility result of section 4 is also broken in this context, we similarly dene
N (z) to be the largest n for whichXn−1 < z and (13) holds when the data are generated underH0.
We make a few additional observations:
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Remark 10. Results analogous to propositions 4 and 6 also apply here. Certain specications of
the researcher’s prior allow us to analytically evaluate the integral on the left hand side of (13)
and simplify the expression for N (z).
Remark 11. Since
√
n − 1X ∗n−1 = (n − 1)θ ∗ +
√
n − 1Z , where θ ∗ denotes the true value of θ and
Z ∼ N(0, 1), the terms √nz and √n − 1X ∗n−1dominate any nite value of θ in order of magnitude
if the researcher has accumulated enough data (for n large enough). This implies that the eect
of any prior distribution F (θ ) that only places positive probability mass over nite values of θ (as
is standard) on the decision of the researcher eventually disappears as the researcher continues to
accumulate data. This feature of the prior distribution being eventually “washed out” from the de-
cision problem is also apparent in the learning context (see remarks 8 and 9). However, this occurs
in the current context because the researcher accumulates data, rather than throwing it away in
each successive latent study. As more data accumulate, the researcher has more information on
the value of future t-statistics.
Remark 12. If H1 holds so θ ∗ , 0,
√
nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1 = −(n − 1)θ ∗ +Op(
√
n)
diverges (in probability) for any nite θ as the researcher accumulates more data. This implies that
for any standard prior distribution F (θ ), the left hand side of (13) converges to one (in probability)
so if c ≤ v and the number of studies already conducted is large, there is a high probability that
the researcher continues to conduct studies and accumulate data until he can reject H0.
The ICCVs when researchers pool data, obtained by Monte Carlo simulations, are illustrated
in gure 3. Here the size distortions we aim to correct are more moderate. Figure 3 displays the
size of a two-sided t -test at the standard CV of 1.96 for various priors (panel A) and various cost-
benet ratios (panel C). When researchers pool datasets, the size is higher than 5%, indicating
size distortion: as high as 20% in panel A and 10% in panel C. Hence, the size distortions when
researchers pool data are less severe than when researchers sample data, as in Figures 1 and 2.
Since the size distortions are smaller, the ICCVs required to bring back the actual test size
to 5% are above the standard value of 1.96, but not by much. The gure displays the ICCV that
delivers a size of 5% for two-sided tests, for various priors (panel B) and various cost-benet ratios
(panel D). Across parameterizations, the ICCV is above 1.96, but never above 2.5.
Figure 3 also shows that the incentives faced by researchers barely affect the ICCV. Across a
broad range of cost-benet ratios from publication, the ICCV remains around 2.2 (panel D). Prior
beliefs about the estimated parameter (especially the prior mean) have a stronger impact on the
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Figure 3. ICCVs at 5% signicance level when researchers pool data
The gure considers researchers who attempt to obtain signicance in two-sided hypothesis tests by pooling iid
datasets. All results are obtained fromMonte-Carlo simulations with the parameter values in table 1, except for those
parameter values specied on the axes. Panels A and C display the size of the hypothesis test at the standard CV of
1.96, for various priors (panel A) and various cost-benet ratios (panel C). If researchers collected only one dataset
and conducted the test on it, as is assumed in classical statistics, the size would be 5%. But when researchers sample
datasets, the size is higher than 5%, sometimes as high as 20%. Panels B and D display the ICCV that delivers a size
of 5%, for various priors (panel B) and various cost-benet ratios (panel D). Across parameterizations, the ICCV falls
between 1.96 and 2.5.
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ICCV. However, if researchers were learning while pooling data, the effect of prior beliefs would
be dampened.
8. General case
In the general case, we would like to allow for dependence across latent studies and potentially
different means of the underlying sequence of latent t -statistics to incorporate observational
studies with dependent data, cases for which the researcher adds or subtracts new data to a study,
instrument selection when using two-stage least squares, regression specication for ordinary
least squares, looking through studies of different precision (resulting in different standard
errors), etc. In this more general formulation of the problem, the latent outcome of empirical
study i ≥ 1 isX ∗i , which is approximately distributed according to the distribution of aN(θi , 1)
distribution with cov(X ∗i ,X ∗j ) ≡ ωij so for any n ≥ 1, we may write
X ∗n ∼ N(θn,Ωn) with θn ≡ [θ1, . . . ,θn]′ and Ωn ≡
[
ωij
]
i,j=1:n .
In particular, θn = 0 underH0. We assume that θn is unknown to the researcher for all n ≥ 1 but
thatΩn is known aer n studies have been conducted. These assumptions approximate the large
sample joint distribution of a set of latent t -statistics for testing (1) in a general framework under
which standard errors and correlations between estimators can be consistently estimated. We
provide concrete examples of these quantities in different research settings below. With a slight
abuse of notation, we denote the researcher’s prior distribution on θn as F (θn) and also discuss
below how a prior distribution on β translates to F (θn).
Sampling data. In the case that each successive study uses an independent sample from the
same population to estimate β , from the point of view of the researcher we have the following
large-sample distributional approximation: βˆi |β iid∼ N(β, var(βˆi)), where var(βˆi) = ς2/Ti for some
ς2 withTi denoting the sample size of the ith study. In this case, sd(βˆi) ≈ ς/
√
Ti so using the form
of the latent t -statistic (2), θi =
√
Ti(β − β0)/ς ≥ 0. Since the studies are independent,Ωn = In.
Finally, suppose the researcher has a prior distribution on β . His prior on each individual θi
is thus the same distribution shied by β0 and scaled by ς/
√
Ti . From the point of view of the
researcher, each θi is a shied and scaled version of the same underlying random variable β ,
making F (θn) degenerate.
Pooling data. Suppose that each successive study simply adds additional data to the previous
study to estimate β , where these additional data are independent and collected from the same
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underlying population. All of the analysis of the previous section applies to this case with the
exception ofΩn = In. Instead,ωij is a decreasing function of |i − j |. In particular, assume that we
can approximate βˆi by a sample mean:
βˆi ≈ 1
Ti
Ti∑
i=1
Yi
for some sequence of independent random variablesY1, . . . ,YTi . This approximation can be used
for instance for standard linear regression estimators. Since the researcher accumulates data
when forming each estimate, further assume thatTi > Ti−1. In this case, we have
cov(βˆi , βˆj) ≈ 1
Tj
var(Yi)
for i ≤ j soωij =
√
Ti/Tj for i ≤ j.
Regression specication. For this example, we assume that the researcher uses ordinary least
squares in the standard linear regression model to estimate the effect of interest. In practice, a
typical effect of interest corresponds to the population value of a regression coefcient. However,
when the researcher uses different regression specications across different latent studies, the
effect of interest is no longer xed across studies so (1)–(2) do not apply in general. Nevertheless,
a simple generalization of (1)–(2) can be used for this example. More specically, suppose that in
the ith study the researcher uses ordinary least squares to estimate a regression coefcient in a
regression of yi onwi from a set ofT independent data points (yi1, . . . ,yiT ) and (wi1, . . . ,wiT ) so
βˆi =
∑T
t=1wityit∑T
t=1w
2
it
.
Here,wi represents the regressor of interest aer it has been projected off of the space spanned
by the covariates included in the ith regression model, allowing for both different specications
of the regressor of interest and covariates across studies. This framework also allows for different
specications of the dependent variable yi across latent studies. When using different regression
specications across different studies, the researcher implicitly sets the object of interest in the
ith study equal to the population regression coefcient
βi =
E(wityit )
E(w2it )
,
where E denotes the expectation operator with respect to the true objective probability measure.
25
From the point of view of the researcher, standard assumptions yield the following large-
sample distributional approximation: βˆi |βi ∼ N(βi , var(βˆi)),where var(βˆi) = var(wityit )/TE(w2it )2.
When allowing for different specications across studies (1) must be modied to
(14) H0 : βi = βi0 versus H1 : βi , βi0
and (2) must be correspondingly modied to
X ∗i =
βˆi − βi0
se(βˆi)
so in large samples
X ∗i |θi iid∼ N(θi , 1), where θi =
√
T (βi − βi0)
sd(wityit )/E(w2it )
.
In addition,
cov(βˆi , βˆj) ≈
cov(wityit ,wjtyjt )
TE(w2it )E(w2jt )
soωij = cov(wityit ,wjtyjt )/[sd(wityit ) sd(wjtyjt )]. In this example, the researcher’s prior distri-
bution on (β1, . . . , βn) induces a prior distribution on θn via simple shiing and scaling. It may
be reasonable in some examples to assume that the researcher has an identical prior distribution
for all βi ’s, leading to a degenerate F (θn).
Instrument selection. By modifying some of the denitions in the previous example, we can
also cover the case for which the researcher uses two-stage least squares in a standard linear
regressionmodel to estimate the effect of interest. Assuming that the instruments are both strong
and valid, we can simply modify the denition ofwi to equal the regressor of interest aer (i) all
regressors have been projected onto the space spanned by the instruments used in the ith study
and then (ii) the resulting regressor of interest has been projected off of the space spanned by the
covariates included in the ith regression model. In the special case for which the researcher uses
the same dependent variable and covariates across all latent studies and only changes the set of
instruments used across studies, if the regression model is correctly specied, (1)–(2) continue to
hold since each βi will simply equal the true regression coefcient.
For the general case, we allow the researcher to learn about the true value of the parameter
of interest in a potentially limited fashion. The researcher’s subjective distribution over θn may
correspond to his prior F (θn), a fully updated posterior F (θn |X ∗n−1) or some other function of the
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data such as a convex combination of his prior and the posterior distribution. We will simply use
F (θn;X ∗n−1) to denote the researcher’s subjective distribution aer n − 1 studies.
We may then express the expected marginal prot of the nth study (3) as
E
(
pi (Xn,Xn−1; z,v, c)
 X ∗n−1) = v ∫ P(|X ∗n |n−1 | > z |θn)dF (θn;X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(n)(15)
= v
∫
[1 −Φ((z − θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1) +Φ((−z − θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1)]dF (θn;X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(n),
whereX ∗
n |n−1 ∼ X ∗n |X ∗n−1 such thatX ∗n |n−1 ∼ N(θn |n−1,ω2n |n−1) with
θn |n−1 ≡ θn +Ωn,21Ω−1n−1[X ∗′n−1 − θn−1],
ω2n |n−1 ≡ 1 −Ωn,21Ω−1n−1Ωn,12,
Ωn ≡
[
Ωn−1 Ωn,12
Ωn,21 1
]
.
Finally, the ICCV z∗ is dened in (4) with N (z) being equal to the largest value of n such that
Xn−1 < z and
(16)
∫
[1 −Φ((z − θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1) +Φ((−z − θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1)]dF (θn;X ∗n−1) ≥
c(n)
v
.
Since we know the distribution of X ∗n−1 under H0, namely N(0,Ωn−1), when it exists, z∗
remains feasible to compute in general: sinceΩn is known for all n ≥ 1, it is straightforward to
compute PH0(Xn > z) for any given n, z by Monte Carlo simulation.
General results with a normal prior. If the researcher’s prior distribution is conjugate with the
normal distribution, we can provide an analytical expression for his posterior distribution. In
this subsection, we assume that the researcher’s prior over θn follows a normal distribution. This
special case is interesting because it allows us to characterizeN (z) and therefore the ICCV dened
in (4) more explicitly. Moreover, a normal prior may be natural in many contexts. For example, if
the researcher’s prior is based upon averaging estimation results from previous studies, a central
limit theorem argument leads to an approximate normal distribution for such an average.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the researcher’s prior on θn follows aN(µn,Σn) distribution for all
n ≥ 1. Then F (θn |X ∗n−1) is equal to the distribution function of a multivariate normal distribution
with mean
µn |n−1 =
(
Ω˜−1n + Σ
−1
n
)−1 (
Ω˜−1n X
∗
n + Σ
−1
n µn
)
.
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and covariance matrix Σn |n−1 ≡ (Ω˜−1n + Σ−1n )−1, where
Ω˜−1n =
[
Ω−1n−1 0
0 0
]
.
By the denition of Ω˜−1n ,
Ω˜−1n X
∗
n =
[
Ω−1n−1X
∗
n−1
0
]
so this distribution only depends upon the realization of the rst n − 1 studies.
To accommodate limited or partial learning on behalf of the researcher, we may specify the
researcher’s subjective distribution aer conducting n − 1 studies as a convex combination of the
his prior and posterior:
F (θn;X ∗n−1) = αF (θn) + (1 − α)F (θn |X ∗n−1),
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that indexes the sophistication of the researcher with α =
1 corresponding to an unsophisticated researcher who does not update his beliefs about the
parameter of interest, α = 0 corresponding to a sophisticated researcher who completely updates
his beliefs and α ∈ (0, 1) corresponding to a partially sophisticated researcher who only partially
updates his beliefs. The results of proposition 8 can also be applied to simplify the computation
of N (z) according to (16) in this case since, for example,∫
Φ((z − θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1)dF (θn;X ∗n−1) = α
∫
Φ((z − θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1)dF (θn)dθn
+ (1 − α)
∫
Φ((z − θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1)dF (θn |X ∗n−1)dθn .
The integral inside the rst term is the expected value ofΦ((z − θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1) when θn follows a
N(µn,Σn) distribution, and the integral inside the second term is the expected value ofΦ((z −
θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1) when θn follows aN(µn |n−1,Σn |n−1) distribution.
9. Conclusion
Statistical hypothesis testing is a key tool for scientic investigation and discovery. It is used to
evaluate existing paradigms, and to assess the effectiveness of new medical treatments, public
policies, and other potential remedies to real-world problems. To be informative, hypothesis test-
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Figure 4. Number of experiments for different CVs
The gure displays the average number of experiments conducted by researchers for different CVs (and in particular
at the ICCV). The results for the case “sampling increasingly costly data” come from the simulations in gure 1. The
results for the case “sampling data with learning” come from the simulations in gure 2. The results for the case
“pooling data” come from the simulations in gure 3. In all the simulations, we set parameter values as in table 1.
ing relies on properly controlling size—the probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis. A major
issue in modern science, however, is that test sizes in published test results are systematically
distorted because scientists are given the incentive to continue to conduct studies until they are
able to reject the null hypothesis they are investigating. This is because rejecting a null hypothesis
is oen considered more interesting from a scientic perspective, and therefore is oen required
for publication. As a result, a true null hypothesis is much more likely to be rejected than what is
advertised in scientic publications.
To correct these size distortions, we construct CVs that are compatible with the incentives
faced by scientists and therefore deliver the promised nominal test size. To construct ICCVs, we
model the strategic behavior of researchers. Researchers face costs and benets from collecting
data, and these incentives determine how many studies are conducted. Once an ICCV is in place,
researchers may conduct several studies to be able to publish their work; nevertheless, readers
can be condent that true null hypotheses are not rejected more oen than a pre-specied
nominal level. Our CVs are larger than standard ones. For example, for two-sided t -tests with a 5%
signicance level, we nd that ICCVs are not 1.96 but between 1.96 and 3 in experimental settings
across a wide range of researcher behavior. The exact values of the ICCVs depend on the costs of
research, rewards from rejecting the null hypothesis, and the researcher’s prior beliefs. Imposing
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the upper bound of 3.4 in this range will control size across all congurations we examined.
Our approach to correcting size distortions in hypothesis tests is to construct CVs that take into
account researchers’ behavior. Another approach is to constrain researchers’ behavior by asking
researchers to register their experiments and analysis plans in advance (Christensen, Freese,
and Miguel 2019, part 3). These two strategies result in a very different research process. Under
ICCVs, researchers pool about 2 studies on average, or sample between 2 and 3 studies, depending
on the learning process and cost structure (gure 4). On the other hand, with preregistration,
researchers should only conduct one study and report those results. Each approach may be
more appropriate in different settings. Ours could be more appropriate for observational data
and in the early stage of a research question, when scientic exploration plays a key role. The
preregistration approach could be better suited to experimental data and later stages of a research
question, when the research question is well understood and delineated, and it is important to
obtain precise estimates of the parameters of interest. Moving forward, it would be useful to
obtain more information on the parameters of our model to improve the calibration of the ICCVs,
and possible adapt them to specic research methodologies. For example, it would be useful to
elicit costs of research methodologies and researchers’ prior beliefs. Indeed, ongoing work on
researcher prior elicitation such as that summarized in DellaVigna, Pope, and Vivalt (2019) could
prove useful for computing more rened ICCVs than the 1.96–3 range found here.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of proposition 1
Aer conducting n − 1 studies, ifXn−1 < z, the researcher chooses to conduct the next study if
and only if (i) the expected direct prot from the next study is positive or (ii) the expected direct
prot from the next study is negative but the expected direct prot from later studies offset the
expected loss from conducting the next study. That is, if and only if (i)
v P(|X ∗n | > z |X∗n−1) − c(n) ≥ 0
or (ii)
v P(|X ∗n | > z |X∗n−1) − c(n) < 0
and ∑
j∈J
{v P(|X ∗n+j | > z |X∗n−1) − c(n + j)} ≥ 0
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for some J ⊂ {1, 2, 3, . . .}. However, sincev P(|X ∗n | > z |X∗n−1) − c(n) ≥ v P(|X ∗n+j | > z |X∗n−1) −
c(n + j) for all j > 0, ifv P(|X ∗n | > z |X∗n−1) − c(n) < 0, thenv P(|X ∗n+j | > z |X∗n−1) − c(n + j) < 0
for all j > 0 so
∑
j∈J {v P(|X ∗n+j | > z |X∗n−1) − c(n + j)} < 0—making (ii) impossible. The result of
the proposition immediately follows.
A.2. Proof of proposition 2
To show (i), note that for anyv, c(1), there exists z¯ > 0 such thatP(|X ∗n | > z |X∗n−1) < c(1)/v for all
z ≥ z¯. Thus by proposition 1,N (z) = 0 for allz ≥ z¯ and thereforePH0(XN (z) > z) = PH0(0 > z) = 0
for all z ≥ z¯.
To show (ii), note that the test using z∗ yields non-zero power if and only if PH1(XN˜ (z∗) ≥
z∗) > 0, where PH1 denotes the objective probability measure for some true value of θ under
the alternative hypothesis. SinceXn is a continuous random variable with support on the entire
positive real line for all n > 0 under any value true of θ consistentH1 (as well asH0), this implies
that the test using z∗ yields non-zero power if and only if N (z∗) > 0. Finally, N (z∗) > 0 if and
only if P(|X ∗1 | > z∗) ≥ c(1)/v .
A.3. Proof of proposition 4
For each case, N (z) is equal to the largest positive integer n such thatXn−1 < z and (8) holds. In
case (i), ∫
[Φ(z − θ ) −Φ(−z − θ )]dF (θ ) = Φ(z − θ˜ ) −Φ(−z − θ˜ )
so (8) is equal to the condition given in (i). In case (ii),∫
[Φ(z − θ ) −Φ(−z − θ )]dF (θ ) = (b − a)−1
∫ b
a
[Φ(z − θ ) −Φ(−z − θ )]dθ
= (b − a)−1[ϕ(z − b) − ϕ(z − a) + (b − z)Φ(z − b) + (z − a)Φ(z − a)
− ϕ(−z − b) + ϕ(−z − a) − (b + z)Φ(−z − b) + (a + z)Φ(−z − a)]
so (8) is equal to the condition given in (ii). In case (iii),∫
[Φ(z − θ ) −Φ(−z − θ )]dF (θ ) = σ−1
∫ ∞
−∞
[Φ(z − θ ) −Φ(−z − θ )]ϕ((θ − µ)/σ )dθ
=
∫ ∞
−∞
[Φ(z − µ − σx) −Φ(−z − µ − σx)]ϕ(x)dx
= Φ((z − µ)/
√
1 + σ 2) −Φ((−z − µ)/
√
1 + σ 2)
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so (8) is equal to the condition given in (iii).
A.4. Proof of proposition 5
Standard posterior contraction results imply that∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ ) +Φ(−z − θ )]dF (θ |X ∗n−1)
p−→ 1 −Φ(z − θ ∗) +Φ(−z − θ ∗)
as n → ∞, so the researcher must eventually stop conducting studies even if he never attains
rejection if 1 −Φ(z − θ ∗) +Φ(−z − θ ∗) < c/v. SinceΦ is strictly increasing, limx→−∞Φ(x) = 0
and limx→∞Φ(x) = 1, this implies the statement of the proposition.
A.5. Proof of proposition 6
Using our knowledge of the distribution ofX ∗n , we have
f (X ∗n |θ ) =
1√(2pi )n exp
(
− 1
2
n∑
i=1
(X ∗i − θ )2
)
f (θ ) = 1√
2piσ 2
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(θ − µ)2
)
so that∫
f (X ∗n |θ )f (θ )dθ =
1√(2pi )n+1σ 2
∫
exp
(
− 1
2
[
n∑
i=1
(θ − X ∗i )2 +
1
σ 2
(θ − µ)2
])
dθ
=
1√(2pi )n+1σ 2
∫
exp
(
− 1
2
(
n +
1
σ 2
)
(θ − h)2
)
dθ exp(k)
=
√(
n + 1σ 2
)−1√(2pi )nσ 2
∫
1√
2pi
(
n + 1σ 2
)−1 exp(− 12 (n + 1σ 2 ) (θ − h)2)dθ exp(k)
=
1√(2pi )n(nσ 2 + 1) exp(k),
where
h =
σ 2
∑n
i=1 X
∗
i + µ
nσ 2 + 1
,
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k = − 1
2
(
n∑
i=1
X ∗2i +
µ2
σ 2
)
+
(∑n
i=1 X
∗
i +
µ
σ 2
)2
2
(
n + 1σ 2
) .
Thus,
f (θ |X ∗n ) =
f (X ∗n |θ )f (θ )∫
f (X ∗n |θ )f (θ )dθ
=
√(2pi )n(nσ 2 + 1)√(2pi )n+1σ 2 exp©­­«−
1
2

n∑
i=1
(θ − X ∗i )2 +
1
σ 2
(θ − µ)2 +
(∑n
i=1 X
∗
i +
µ
σ 2
)2
n + 1σ 2
−
(
n∑
i=1
X ∗2i +
µ2
σ 2
)
ª®®¬
=
1√
2piσ 2
n+1|n
exp
(
−
(
θ − µn+1|n
)2
2σ 2
n+1|n
)
.
This means that θ |X ∗n has a normal distribution with mean µn+1|n and variance σ 2n+1|n. The state-
ment of the proposition then follows from analogous arguments to those made in the proof of
proposition 4(iii).
A.6. Proof of proposition 7
IfH0 holds so θ ∗ = 0,
PH0
(
1 −Φ
(√
nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)
+Φ
(
−√nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)
<
c
v
)
is positive for alln and any nite θ and c ≤ v. This implies that for any standard prior distribution
F (θ ), if H0 is true, the probability that the researcher stops conducting additional studies is
positive at every stage. Moreover,
PH0
(
1 −Φ
(√
nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)
+Φ
(
−√nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)
<
c
v
)
≥ PH0
(
1 −Φ
(√
nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)
<
c
2v
,Φ
(
−√nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)
<
c
2v
)
= PH0
(−√nz − θ −Φ−1(c/2v)√
n − 1 < X
∗
n−1 <
√
nz − θ −Φ−1(1 − c/2v)√
n − 1
)
= Φ
(√
nz − θ −Φ−1(1 − c/2v)√
n − 1
)
−Φ
(−√nz − θ −Φ−1(c/2v)√
n − 1
)
→ Φ(z) −Φ(−z) > 0
as n →∞ so even as the researcher accumulates more data, the probability that the researcher
continues to conduct more studies remains bounded away from one. Thus, the statement of the
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proposition holds.
A.7. Proof of proposition 8
If the researcher’s prior distribution F (θn) admits a pdf f (θn), for n ≥ 2, the posterior pdf for θn
takes the form
(A1) f (θn |X ∗n−1) =
f (X ∗n−1 |θn)f (θn)∫
f (X ∗n−1 |θn)f (θn)dθn
,
where the likelihood f (X ∗n−1 |θn) is the pdf of aN(θn−1,Ωn−1) distribution evaluated atX ∗n−1. As a
notational convention, for n = 1, f (θn |X ∗n−1) is equal to f (θn). Given that the researcher’s prior
on θn follows aN(µn,Σn) distribution for all n ≥ 1,
f (X ∗n−1 |θn) =
1√(2pi )n−1 |Ωn−1 | exp
(
− 1
2
(X ∗n−1 − θn−1)′Ω−1n−1(X ∗n−1 − θn−1)
)
(A2)
f (θn) = 1√(2pi )n |Σn | exp
(
− 1
2
(θn − µn)′Σ−1n (θn − µn)
)
(A3)
so for
Ω˜−1n =
[
Ω−1n−1 0
0 0
]
,
A = − 1
2
(
Ω˜−1n + Σ
−1
n
)
,
b = Ω˜−1n X
∗
n + Σ
−1
n µn,
c = − 1
2
(
X ∗′n Ω˜
−1
n X
∗
n + µ
′
nΣ
−1
n µn
)
,
h = −A−1b/2 and k = c − b′A−1b/4, we have∫
f (X ∗n−1 |θn)f (θn)dθn
=
1√(2pi )2n−1 |Ωn−1 | |Σn |
×
∫
exp
(
− 1
2
[
(θn −X ∗n )′Ω˜−1n (θn −X ∗n ) + (θn − µn)′Σ−1n (θn − µn)
] )
dθn
=
1√(2pi )2n−1 |Ωn−1 | |Σn |
∫
exp([θn − h]′A[θn − h])dθn exp(k)
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=
1√(2pi )n−12|A| |Ωn−1 | |Σn |
∫
1√
(2pi )n 12 |A−1 |
exp([θn − h]′A[θn − h])dθn exp(k)
=
1√(2pi )n−12|A| |Ωn−1 | |Σn | exp(k)
=
1√
(2pi )n−1 |Ω˜−1n Σn + In | |Ωn−1 |
exp(k).
Thus, (A1)–(A3) imply
f (θn |X ∗n−1) =
√
(2pi )n−1 |Ω˜−1n Σn + In | |Ωn−1 |√(2pi )n−1 |Ωn−1 |(2pi )n |Σn | exp(−(1/2)(X ∗n−1 − θn−1)′Ω−1n−1(X ∗n−1 − θn−1)
− (1/2)(θn − µn)′Σ−1n (θn − µn) − k)
=
√
|Ω˜−1n + Σ−1n |√(2pi )n exp(−(1/2)θ ′n[Ω˜−1n + Σ−1n ]θn + θ ′n[Ω˜−1n X ∗n + Σ−1n µn]
+ (1/2)[X ∗′n Ω˜−1n + µ′nΣ−1n ][Ω˜−1n + Σ−1n ]−1[Ω˜−1n X ∗n + Σ−1n µn])
=
1√
(2pi )n |[Ω˜−1n + Σ−1n ]−1 |
exp
(
− 1
2
(θn − µn |n−1)′[Ω˜−1n + Σ−1n ](θn − µn |n−1)
)
.
This implies that the statement of the proposition holds.
Appendix B. One-sided hypothesis testing
The main text focuses on two-sided hypothesis tests. This appendix presents analogous results
for upper one-sided hypotheses
(A4) H0 : β = β0 versus H1 : β > β0.
This analysis also covers lower one-sided hypotheses for which the alternative is insteadH1 : β <
β0 by simply redening the parameter of interest β to be equal to its negative value. We state
results briey, omitting discussions and derivations since they are analogous to those for the
two-sided problem.
For the one-sided hypotheses (A4), redeneXn = max
{
X ∗1 , . . . ,X
∗
n
}
. Replace (3) with
E
(
pi (Xn,Xn−1; z,v, c)
 X ∗n−1) = v P(Xn > z  X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(n)
= v P
(
max
{
X ∗n ,Xn−1
}
> z
 X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(n)
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= v P
(
X ∗n > z
 X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(n).
Proposition 1 should be modied to the following.
Proposition A1. Suppose v P(X ∗n > z |X∗n−1) − c(n) ≥ v P(X ∗n+j > z |X∗n−1) − c(n + j) for all j > 0.
Then the researcher chooses to conduct the next study if and only if Xn−1 < z and
v P(X ∗n > z |X∗n−1) − c(n) ≥ 0.
Proposition 2 should be modied to the following.
Proposition A2. Suppose v P(X ∗n > z |X∗n−1) − c(n) ≥ v P(X ∗n+j > z |X∗n−1) − c(n + j) for all j > 0
and c(1) > 0. The ICCV z∗ dened in (4), (i) exists and (ii) yields a test with non-zero power if and
only if P(X ∗1 > z∗) ≥ c(1)/v .
Replace display (5) with
H0 : θ = 0 versus H1 : θ > 0,
display (6) with
E
(
pi (Xn,Xn−1; z,v, c)
 X ∗n−1) = v ∫ P(X ∗n > z  X ∗n−1,θ )dF (θ ) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c
= v
∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ )]dF (θ ) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c,
display (7) with ∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ )]dF (θ ) ≥ c
v
,
display (8) with ∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ )]dF (θ ) ≥ c(n)
v
,
and display (9) with ∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ )]dF (θ ) < c(1)
v
.
The statement immediately following proposition 3 should be replaced by the following: “Since
Xn is the maximum of nmean-zero iid normal variables underH0, PH0(Xn < z) = Φ(z)n for z ≥ 0
so we can rewrite the (implicit) denition of the ICCV in this context as the smallest value z∗ such
that
1 −Φ(z∗)N (z∗) ≤ α .”
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Proposition 4 should be modied to the following:
Proposition A3. In the increasing cost setting of this section, N (z) is equal to the maximum
positive integer n for which Xn−1 < z and
1. if dF (θ ) = δ (θ˜ )dθ for some θ˜ ∈ R, where δ denotes the Dirac delta function,
n ≤ c−1
(
v[1 −Φ(z − θ˜ )]
)
;
2. if dF (θ ) = (b − a)−1 1(a ≤ θ ≤ b)dθ for some a < b,
n ≤ c−1(v[1 − (b − a)−1{ϕ(z − b) − ϕ(z − a) + (b − z)Φ(z − b) + (z − a)Φ(z − a)}]);
3. if dF (θ ) = σ−1ϕ((θ − µ)/σ )dθ for some µ ∈ R and σ > 0,
n ≤ c−1(v[1 −Φ((z − µ)/
√
1 + σ 2)]).
Replace display (11) with
(A5)
∫
[1 −Φ(z − θ )]dF (θ |X ∗n−1) ≥
c
v
.
In the paragraph preceding proposition 5, |X ∗n−1 | should be replaced with X ∗n−1. Proposition 5
should be modied to the following:
Proposition A4. Let θ ∗ denote the true value of θ . For any CV z large enough such that 1 −
Φ(z − θ ∗) < c/v , the researcher will eventually stop conducting studies even if he never attains
rejection.
Proposition 6 should be modied to the following:
Proposition A5. In the learning while sampling setting of this section, if dF (θ ) = σ−1ϕ((θ −
µ)/σ )dθ for some µ ∈ R and σ > 0, then N (z) is the largest positive integer n for which Xn−1 < z
and
1 −Φ ©­­«
z − µn |n−1√
1 + σ 2
n |n−1
ª®®¬ ≥ c/v,
where
µn |n−1 =
σ 2
∑n−1
i=1 X
∗
i + µ
(n − 1)σ 2 + 1 and σ
2
n |n−1 =
σ 2
(n − 1)σ 2 + 1 .
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In remark 9, “1 −Φ(z − θ ∗) +Φ(−z − θ ∗) < c/v” should be replaced by “1 −Φ(z − θ ∗) < c/v”.
Replace display (12) with
E
(
pi (Xn,Xn−1; z,v, c)
 X ∗n−1) = v ∫ P(X ∗n > z  X ∗n−1,θ )dF (θ ) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c
= v
∫ [
1 −Φ
(√
nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)]
dF (θ ) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c,
display (13) with ∫ [
1 −Φ
(√
nz − θ − √n − 1X ∗n−1
)]
dF (θ ) ≥ c
v
,
display (14) with
H0 : βi = βi0 versus H1 : βi > βi0,
display (15) with
E
(
pi (Xn,Xn−1; z,v, c)
 X ∗n−1) = v ∫ P(X ∗n |n−1 > z |θn)dF (θn;X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(n)
= v
∫
[1 −Φ((z − θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1)]dF (θn;X ∗n−1) 1(Xn−1 < z) − c(n)
and display (16) with ∫
[1 −Φ((z − θn |n−1)/ωn |n−1)]dF (θn;X ∗n−1) ≥
c(n)
v
.
Appendix C. Calibration of researcher’s prior
Asmentioned in section 3, the two previous articles to which we calibrate Dal Bo’s prior, Roth and
Murnighan (1978) and Murnighan and Roth (1983), do not provide standard error or t -statistic
values, but only estimates of β . Nevertheless, the structure of the matched pairs experimental
design in each of these two papers allows us to compute bounds for the estimated standard error
for βˆ as follows. Roth andMurnighan (1978) and Murnighan and Roth (1983) report the number of
subjects in their experiments who choose to cooperate under high and low probabilities of future
interaction and compare the arithmetic averages of these two numbers to assess whether there is
statistical evidence that the probability of cooperation is different under high vs low levels of
future interaction. Between these two papers, the authors conduct four total experiments.
Formally, in each experiment, the authors report the sample sizen,
∑n
i=1 yi and
∑n
i=1 xi , where
yi = 1 if individual i chooses to cooperate under low probability of future interaction and yi = 0
otherwise, and xi = 1 if individual i chooses to cooperate under high probability of future
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interaction and xi = 0 otherwise. They then estimate β as the difference in the sample averages of
these values between the same set of individuals: βˆ = n−1
∑n
i=1 xi −n−1
∑n
i=1 yi = n
−1 ∑n
i=1(xi −yi).
Though the authors report that βˆ is statistically different from zero in each experiment, they
neither provide t -statistics nor standard errors. However, in a matched pairs design, the standard
error is calculated as se(βˆ) = n−1/2ŝd(xi − yi), where
ŝd(xi − yi) =
√∑n
i=1(xi − yi − βˆ)2
n − 1
is a consistent estimator of sd(xi − yi). Since
n∑
i=1
(xi − yi − βˆ)2 =
n∑
i=1
x2i − 2
n∑
i=1
xiyi +
n∑
i=1
y2i − nβˆ2 =
n∑
i=1
xi +
n∑
i=1
yi − nβˆ2 − 2
n∑
i=1
xiyi
and
0 ≤
n∑
i=1
xiyi ≤ min
{
n∑
i=1
xi ,
n∑
i=1
yi
}
,
we can bound ŝd(xi − yi) as follows: ŝdlb ≤ ŝd(xi − yi) ≤ ŝdub , where
ŝdlb =
√∑n
i=1 xi +
∑n
i=1 yi − nβˆ2 − 2 min
{∑n
i=1 xi ,
∑n
i=1 yi
}
n − 1 , ŝdub =
√∑n
i=1 xi +
∑n
i=1 yi − nβˆ2
n − 1
can be computed directly from the values reported in Roth and Murnighan (1978) and Murnighan
and Roth (1983). To calibrate Dal Bo’s prior, we simply took the midpoint of these two bounds as
a reasonable value for ŝd(xi − yi) that the researcher would infer from these previous studies
when forming his prior on the mean of the t -statistic β/sd(βˆ). More specically, we calibrated
the researcher’s prior for β/sd(βˆ) as follows:
1. Calculate σˆj(xi − yi) = 0.5ŝdlb,j + 0.5ŝdub,j , where ŝdlb,j and ŝdub,j are equal to the values
of ŝdlb and ŝdub in the jth study for each of the j = 1, . . . , 4 studies in Roth and Murnighan
(1978) and Murnighan and Roth (1983).
2. Calculate tj =
√
nj βˆj/σˆj(xi − yi), where nj is the sample size and βˆj is the estimate of β in
study j. This serves as an approximation to the t -statistic obtain in each of the j = 1, . . . , 4
studies in Roth and Murnighan (1978) and Murnighan and Roth (1983).
3. Calculate themeanof the researcher’s prior for β/sd(βˆ) asE(β/sd(βˆ)) = ∑4j=1wj√48.75/njtj ,
where the weightswj = nj/∑4i=1 ni correspond to the relative sample size of study j. The
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Table A1. Marginal cost-benet ratio bounds
n¯ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EH0 [P
( |X ∗n¯+1 | > z  X ∗n¯ )] 0.366 0.266 0.212 0.180 0.158 0.142 0.130
EH0 [P
( |X ∗n¯ | > z  X ∗n¯−1)] 0.596 0.366 0.266 0.212 0.180 0.158 0.142
scaling by
√
48.75/nj inside of the sum is used to account for the fact that Dal Bo’s average
sample size is 48.75, rather than nj .
4. Calculate the variance of the researcher’s prior for β/sd(βˆ) as
var(β/sd(βˆ)) =
4∑
j=1
wj
(√
48.75/njtj −
4∑
i=1
wi
√
48.75/niti
)2
.
Appendix D. Indirect elicitation of cost-benet ratio
Suppose we knew the maximum number of studies n¯ a researcher would typically conduct under
H0 without rejectingH0 at a given CV z before stopping and moving on to a different research
project. Using proposition 1, we could then infer vEH0[P
(|X ∗n¯ | > z  X ∗n¯−1)] − c(n¯) ≥ 0 and
vEH0[P
(|X ∗n¯+1 | > z  X ∗n¯ )] − c(n¯ + 1) < 0, where the expectations are taken over the distribution
ofX ∗n¯−1 andX
∗
n¯ under the objective probability measure whenH0 is true. If marginal costs are
constant, we could then bound the marginal cost-to-payoff ratio:
EH0[P
(|X ∗n¯+1 | > z  X ∗n¯ )] < cv ≤ EH0[P(|X ∗n¯ | > z  X ∗n¯−1)].
Moreover, if we were able to obtain this maximum number of studies across a range of CVs z, so
n¯ is a function of z, we could tighten these bounds:
sup
z
EH0
[
P
(
|X ∗n¯(z)+1 | > z
 X ∗n¯(z))] < cv ≤ infz EH0 [P( |X ∗n¯(z) | > z  X ∗n¯(z)−1)] .
In principle, this could be achieved by surveying researchers, although a mechanism eliciting
truthful reporting would be crucial to such an analysis.
As a practical illustration, consider the pooling data paradigmof section 7 and setting the prior
of the researcher according to the calibration in section 3. In this case since
√
n¯ − 1Xn¯−1/
√
1 + σ 2 ∼
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N(0, (n¯ − 1)/(1 + σ 2)) underH0, we obtain
EH0[P
( |X ∗n¯+1 | > z  X ∗n¯ )] = EH0 [1 −Φ (√n¯ + 1z − √n¯X ∗n¯ − µ√
1 + σ 2
)
+Φ
(
−√n¯ + 1z − √n¯X ∗n¯ − µ√
1 + σ 2
)]
= 1 −Φ
(√
n¯ + 1z − µ√
1 + σ 2 + n¯
)
+Φ
(
−√n¯ + 1z − µ√
1 + σ 2 + n¯
)
,
where µ and σ 2 are the mean and variance of the researcher’s prior distribution on β/sd(βˆ).
Similarly,
EH0[P
(|X ∗n¯ | > z  X ∗n¯−1)] = 1 −Φ (√n¯z − µ√
σ 2 + n¯
)
+Φ
(
−√n¯z − µ√
σ 2 + n¯
)
.
Table A1 records these bounds for c/v corresponding to different values of n¯ for the standard CV
of z = 1.96. Dal Bo (2005) conducted four studies. If we assume that this is the number of studies
he would typically conduct under a true H0 (so n¯ = 4), we recover bounds consistent with the
calibrated value of c/v = 933/5000 = 0.187 from table 1.
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